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USE OF JUDGE'S DISCRETION AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE OHIO "ALIBI STATUTE" AS CONSTRUED
AND APPLIED
State v. Cunningham
89 Ohio L. Abs. 206, 185 N.E.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1961)
On the first day of his trial for burglary the defendant gave notice of
his intention to produce testimony of alibi. The testimony was to be given
by a clergyman who informed the defense counsel for the first time on the
day preceding the trial that defendant was with him far from the scene of
the alleged crime on the date in question. Defendant did not remember his
whereabouts due to a four-year interval between that date and his in-
dictment. The trial court refused to receive evidence of alibi, applying the
Ohio "alibi statute"' which requires three days' notice of defendant's
intention to claim alibi and places discretion in the trial judge to exclude
any alibi evidence if the statute is not followed. The court of appeals affirmed,
stating that the trial judge had not abused his discretion and that the statute
was constitutional on its face and as applied. 2
Alibi statutes have been enacted in fourteen states3 changing the common
law rule that evidence of alibi was admissible under the general plea of not
guilty.4 These statutes attempt to prevent presentation of surprise alibi
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.58 (1953):
Whenever a defendant in a criminal case proposes to offer in his defense, testi-
mony to establish an alibi on his behalf, such defendant shall, not less than
three days before the trial of such cause, file and serve upon the prosecuting
attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim such an alibi. Notice
shall include specific information as to the place at which the defendant claims
to have been at the time of the alleged offense. If the defendant fails to file
such written notice, the court may exclude evidence offered by the defendant
for the purpose of proving such alibi. (Emphasis added.)
2 State v. Cunningham, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 206, 185 N.E.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1961),
motion for leave to appeal overruled, Oct. 11, 1961.
3 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 192B; Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 9-1631 to 1633 (1956); Iowa Code
§ 777.18 (1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62.1341 (1949); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 768.20-.21
(1948); Minn. Stat. § 630.14 (1947); N.J. Rules 3:5-9; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 295-1;
Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.58 (1953); Okla Stat. tit. 22, § 585 (1961); S.D. Code § 2801
(1939); Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-17 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 6561-62 (1958); Wis.
Stat. § 955.07 (1957). See also Committee on Rules Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, Rule 12A,
Notice of Alibi 5-6 (1962).
4 Fletcher, "Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases," 12 Stan. L. Rev. 293,
315 (1959). See Goldstein, "The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure," 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1186 (1960). Many states have enacted similar
statutes requiring notice of defendant's intention to plead insanity at the time of the
act. See Fletcher, supra. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Crim. P. 192A; Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1701
(1956); Ohio Rev. Code § 2943.03 (1953).
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defenses near the trial's end without affording the prosecution adequate
opportunity to check the credibility of the witnesses or the accuracy of the
statements. 5
These statutory changes in the common law appear basically procedural
and are designed to facilitate a search for the truth in criminal prosecutions.
The procedural changes are not unreasonable in permitting the judge to
exclude evidence if the defendant knows the evidence is available and can
reasonably give notice. Accordingly, the statutes have been declared consti-
tutional by the weight of authority.6
However, a substantial due process problem is presented when the alibi
statute is applied to exclude material defenses where advance notice is not
feasible and no indication of suppression by the defense exists. In the instant
case, the court of appeals recognized this problem but followed State v. Thayer
as authority for the constitutionality of the act as applied.7
In Thayer the defendant was charged with soliciting a bribe on or about
August 15. The state's witnesses variously placed the date of the crime from
August 10 to August 28. Evidence of alibi offered by two defense witnesses
was excluded because the defendant failed to give the statutory notice.8 The
court of appeals reversed, partially on the basis that the alibi statute was
unconstitutional. 9 Although the supreme court affirmed on nonconstitutional
grounds, Judge Kinkade, in writing the majority opinion, stated that the
statute was constitutional.' ° Despite Judge Kinkade's dictum, three of the
five judges joining in the majority opinion concurred in finding the statute
unconstitutional as construed and applied to the particular facts of the
5 State v. Kapacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d 495 (1952); State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio
St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931); State v. Schade, 101 Misc. 212, 292 N.Y. Supp. 612 (Sup.
Ct. 1930).
6 State v. Thayer, supra note 5; State v. Schade, supra note 5. For cases affirming
the constitutionality of the parallel insanity statutes, see People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35,
273 Pac. 767 (1928); People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 208 Pac. 909 (1928). However,
Judge Allen, in a dictum in Evans v. State, 123 Ohio St. 132, 138, 174 N.E. 348, 350
(1930), cast doubt on the constitutionality of the Ohio insanity statute. ". . . [Aln
enactment which would deprive an insane person of a defense going to the very vitals
of his case, because of non-action upon the part of his attorney, would necessarily be
unconstitutional, upon the ground that it would deprive such insane person of due
process of law."
7 State v. Cunningham, supra note 2.
8 As required by Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.58 (1953).
9 State v. Thayer, supra note 5. No reasons were offered to support the declaration
of unconstitutionality.
10 State v. Thayer, supra note 5, at 4, 176 N.E. at 657:
We cannot concur with the Court of Appeals in the reasons, assigned by that
court to sustain the unconstitutionality of section [2945.58]. This law pertains
to a very important feature of criminal law. It gives the state some protection
against false and fraudulent claims often presented by the accused so near the
close of the trial as to make it impossible for the state to ascertain any facts as
to the credibility of the witness called by the accused, who may reside at some
point far distant from the place of trial.
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case." In using Thayer as authority, the court in the instant case mistakenly
treated the concurring opinion as a minority rather than majority view.' 2
Both Thayer and Cunningham are significant because their particular
facts place them beyond the constitutional purpose of the alibi statute. The
indefinite date of the alleged crime made it impossible for the defendant in
Thayer to give notice of his alibi defense. Defendant in Cunningham could
not give the required notice because he had no actual knowledge of the
clergyman's recollection until the day before trial. There was no suppression
on his part; notice was served the day following the discovery of an alibi.
The trial judge's refusal to accept evidence of alibi had the effect of unreason-
ably denying defendant a defense material to his innocence and unavailable
to him in time to meet the requirements of the statute. This denial of an
opportunity to present a defense has in other contexts been deemed
fundamentally unfair and, therefore, violative of fourteenth amendment due
process.
For example, regarding jurisdiction of the person in civil cases, due
process requires that the defendant be given adequate notice,' 3 to assure
him of the opportunity to assert defenses. Similarly, in contempt proceedings
due process requires that the accused be advised of the charges and be
given a reasonable opportunity to defend. 1 4 Moreover, due process now
requires the appointment of counsel for the indigent in all state criminal
cases.'; Assuredly, however, appointment of counsel is but an empty gesture
11 State v. Thayer, supra note 5, at 12, 176 N.E. at 659. Six judges participated
in the decision, but one of these concurred only in the judgment. Judge Mathias and
two concurring judges held: "The operative effect of the statute therefore as applied
in this case deprived defendant of his rights under the due process provisions of the
Constitution."
12 State v. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 210, 185 N.E. at 328: "Since this holding
of the minority concurring opinion was the only reason for the separate opinion, it
would seem that the majority disagree with this position."
13 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), held that under fourteenth amendment
due process a personal judgment rendered in a state court against a nonresident without
personal service within the state or his appearance in the action was without validity.
Accord, Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Company, 242 U.S. 394 (1917).
14 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925): "Due process of law, there-
fore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires
that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity
to meet them by the way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the right to
assistance of counsel . . . ." See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440 (1932).
15 Gideon v. Wainwright, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). The Supreme Court overruled
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 445 (1942), and held that the indigent defendant's right to
appointment of counsel in all felony cases was fundamental and guaranteed from
abridgement by the state by fourteenth amendment due process. In Betts the Court held
that on the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the failure to appoint counsel
was not so offensive to the concept of fundamental fairness as to amount to a denial
of due process. The following cases, applying the Betts view, held that there was a
denial of due process under the facts of the particular case. See Chewning v. Cunning-
ham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Hamilton v. Alabama,
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
if, as happened in the instant case, all evidence of a defense is unreasonably
excluded.' 6
Alibi statutes serve a legitimate purpose, but only if they are limited in
application to cases in which the defendant has a reasonable opportunity to
give notice or there is evidence of suppression. Both Judge Kinkade in
Thayer and the court in Cunningham misinterpreted the purpose of the
statute and thereby created a problem of constitutionality. Had the statute
been properly interpreted, it would have been held in both cases that the
statute was inapplicable, and the constitutional problem never would have
arisen. The exclusion in the instant case was improper for it was not within
either the purpose or spirit in which the statute was enacted.
368 U.S. 52 (1962). Unlike Gideon, each of these cases stresses the complexity of the
defense and the importance of counsel for the preservation of any available defense.
Although Gideon erased the factual distinctions (i.e., seriousness of the felony
and complexity of the defense) in felony right-to-counsel cases, the question remains
whether the defendant will have an absolute right to counsel in cases involving a
misdemeanor.
16 The defense in Cunningham completely depended upon the testimony of the
clergyman; defendant could not remember his whereabouts. Therefore he was not
merely denied the opportunity to present his defense in the most effective manner,
but was denied the opportunity to present the defense altogether. In Thayer, defendant
was permitted to give testimony that he was elsewhere even though statutory notice
was not given. However, all corroborating evidence was excluded. Exclusion of such
evidence, an integral part of the alibi defense, substantially impedes the presentation
of the defense. Thus, the subtle question presented by Thayer is whether an impediment,
short of a complete denial of the defense, has constitutional dimensions.
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